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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20061147-CA

v.
DENNY LEE MOORE,
Defendant/Appellant -

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction on one count of
possession of an incendiary or explosive device, a second degree
felony (R. 186-88).x

This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e)(West 2004).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Did the trial court properly deny defendant's mistrial
motion based on prosecutorial misconduct where defendant did not
establish that, absent the alleged misconduct, he would likely
have enjoyed a more favorable trial outcome?

1

Throughout his brief, defendant describes the crime from
which he is appealing as "reckless possession." While the minute
entries consistently describe the crime as "reckless possession,"
both the information and the signed jury verdict refer simply to
"possession." Compare, e.g., R. 170-73, 186-88 with R. 1-2, 162.
The jury was instructed consistent with the information and
signed jury verdict. That is, the jury was instructed that a
mens rea of knowing, intentional, or reckless would suffice to
establish the crime. .See R. 199: 180, 192-93.

A reviewing court will not reverse a trial court's denial of
a motion for mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct absent an
abuse of discretion.
P.3d 1278.

State v. Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, 11 10, 69

This standard is met only if, absent the error,

defendant would have enjoyed a reasonable likelihood of a more
favorable result.

Id. (emphasizing that trial court is best

positioned to assess an alleged error's impact on the proceedings).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-306(3)(West 2004), governing
possession of explosive, chemical, or incendiary devices,
provides:
Any person is guilty of a second degree
felony who, under circumstances not amounting
to a violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part
4, Weapons of Mass Destruction, knowingly,
intentionally, or recklessly possesses or
controls an explosive, chemical, or
incendiary device.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with one count of possession of an
explosive device, a second degree felony (R. 1-2). 2

A jury

convicted him as charged (R. 162, R. 199: 229). The court

2

He was convicted of possession of an incendiary
device.
Compare R. 1-2 with R. 186-88. The difference, however, is
insignificant. The governing statute treats "explosive,
chemical, or incendiary device[s]" interchangeably. All three
terms include "dynamite and all other forms of high explosives, .
. . blasting agents to include. . .blasting caps, [and]. . .
exploding cords commonly called detonating cord [or] detcord . .
.." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-306(1) (a) (i) (West 2004) .
2

sentenced defendant to a suspended prison term of one-to-fifteen
years; ordered 36 months of probation, 150 hours of community
service, and payment of fines and fees; and imposed a variety of
conditions (R. 186-88).

Defendant filed a timely notice of

appeal (R. 189).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
After receiving a tip from defendant's ex-wife and her
partner that defendant had dynamite in his possession, two police
officers conducted a "knock and talk" at defendant's home (R.
199: 32-34).

Defendant answered the door.

Officer Olive

introduced himself and Officer Jones-Williams, showed defendant
his credentials, and asked if it was okay to ask some questions
(Id. at 36, 86). After defendant granted permission, the officer
told defendant to think carefully before answering.

He then

asked, "''Do you have any dynamite in the house?'" (Id. at 36,
86).
v>,v

Defendant paused, looked around the yard, and answered,

Yes, I do'" (Id. ) .

Officer Olive asked defendant if he would

show it to him (Id. at 37).

Defendant said, "^Yes,'" and led the

officers away from several children playing nearby to a root
cellar located about 30 yards away in the backyard (Id. at 3739) .
Using Officer Jones-Williams' flashlight for illumination,
the three entered the structure through a wooden door hinged for
a padlock, and then descended a flight of about 15 stairs into a

3

single, small, dark room (Id. at 39-40).

As defendant opened the

unsecured door, he commented to the officers, " x It looks like
someone broke into it'" (Id. at 40). Officer Jones-Williams
described the cellar:
The room is — was a very small room. You
really — there were no corners to hide in,
nothing, I mean, entering the cellar you
could see what was in there. To the left
there was a pallet with a few boxes on it, I
don't recall how many boxes. And then to the
right of that, there were two more boxes on
the ground.
(Id. at 88-89).
At the bottom of the stairs, defendant looked around and
told the officers, " A Well, this is where the dynamite was.'" (Id.
at 41). Officer Olive asked if he could examine the two boxes on
the ground.

Defendant consented, and the officer, feeling with

gloved hands under the sawdust in the box, discovered two eightinch sticks of soft gel dynamite (Id. at 42-43).

He also

observed "a wet substance on the concrete floor" coming from the
box, which led him to conclude the dynamite was "sweating" and
thus becoming more unstable, as well as several partial rolls of
detonator cord (Id. at 45-46, 63-64, 66-67).
After the officers saw the detonator cord, defendant began
verbally distancing himself from the explosives by offering a
variety of explanations for their presence in the root cellar
(Id. at 44-45, 48). He claimed the root cellar had been broken
into a week earlier (Id. at 122). He suggested that a cleaning
4

crew or painters who had worked for him might have left the
explosives (Id. at 44, 74).

Finally, he surmised that his ex-

wife left the explosives in the root cellar to frame him (Id. at
44, 48, 72) .
At this juncture, having observed potentially unstable
dynamite as well at det cord, the officers agreed, "it's time to
gracefully back out, and that's what we did" (Id. at 46-47).

A

Salt Lake County bomb squad technician was notified, and he
immediately reported to the scene (Id. at 43, 90).

In addition

to the dynamite and detonator cord, the bomb technician found a
box of #8 blasting caps, sufficient to detonate either the
dynamite or det cord (Id. at 102). After evacuating the
residential block, the bomb technician removed the explosives,
later confirming that they were fully functional (Id. at 110-11).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion
in denying his mistrial motion based on prosecutorial misconduct
for certain remarks and questions made during trial.

He contends

the prosecutor intended these comments and questions to invoke
fear in the jury and caused the jury to convict him improperly.
The trial court ruled that one brief comment referencing
terrorism was, indeed, improper but had been cured by defendant's
prompt objection, followed by striking the comment, an immediate
admonition to disregard it, and a later instruction that the jury

5

must not consider any matters stricken by the court.

The court

also ruled that it did not "think that the bounds were exceeded"
with respect to other comments and questions referencing the
dangers of explosives to children and issues of safe storage and
proper handling of explosives.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion.

The court was

in the most advantaged position to evaluate the impact of the
fleeting reference to terrorism on the trial as a whole.

It

cannot reasonably be said that the prosecutor's brief misstep,
ameliorated by the court in multiple ways, deprived defendant of
a fair trial.
Even assuming arguendo that the remaining references were
improper, defendant has wholly failed to demonstrate any
prejudicial effect.

First, the evidence against him was

substantial and strong.

He admitted he had explosives in his

home and led the officers directly to them.
was weak.

Second, his defense

His own witness denied possessing the explosives.

And, third, any prosecutorial error was ameliorated by the jury
instructions, to which defendant has mounted no challenge.
Defendant is entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect one.
Where defendant has not shown that, absent the allegedly improper
comments and questions, he would likely have enjoyed a better
trial outcome, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying
his mistrial motion based on prosecutorial misconduct.

6

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED
DEFENDANT'S MISTRIAL MOTION BASED
ON PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT WHERE
DEFENDANT DID NOT ESTABLISH THAT,
ABSENT THE ALLEGED MISCONDUCT, HE
WOULD LIKELY HAVE ENJOYED A MORE
FAVORABLE TRIAL OUTCOME
The gist of defendant's argument is that the trial court
should have granted his mistrial motion because the prosecutor
committed misconduct by making statements and asking questions
that were irrelevant, that inflamed the passions of the jury, and
that prejudiced the outcome of his case.

Specifically, he

contends, because the prosecutor misinterpreted recklessness —
one of the three possible mental states for possession of an
explosive device — he made statements and asked questions that
"focused on issues such as children and explosives, improper
storage of explosives, and explosives and terrorists."
Aplt. at 6; accord id. at 13-15.

Br. of

This focus, he asserts, was

"meant to invoke the sympathies, passions and fears of the jury
and to confuse the jury as to what the elements were."
15.

Id. at

Absent the objectionable remarks, defendant contends, the

jury would have entertained a reasonable doubt that he knowingly,
intentionally, or recklessly possessed the explosives.

Id. at

20.
To demonstrate prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must
first show that counsel's conduct "call[ed] to the attention of

7

the jury a matter it would not be justified in considering in
determining its verdict." State v. Bradley, 2002 UT App 348, 5
42, 57 P.3d 1139 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Defendant must then show "that the effect of [the prosecutor's
conduct] was ^substantial and prejudicial such that there is a
reasonable likelihood that, in [its] absence, there would have
been a more favorable result.'" State v. Devey, 2006 UT App 219,
1 10, 138 P.3d 90 (quoting State v. Wright, 893 P.2d 1113, 1118
(Utah App. 1995)).

" x [I]f proof of defendant's guilt is strong,

the challenged conduct or remark will not be presumed
prejudicial.'"

State v. Vargas, 2001 UT 5, 1 45, 20 P.3d 271

(citation omitted); see also

State v. Schultz, 2002 UT App 366,

5 35, 58 P.3d 879 (holding that error in admitting evidence was
harmless where other evidence supporting conviction was
substantial); State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 700 (Utah App.
1995)(admission of irrelevant evidence, although an abuse of
discretion, was nonetheless harmless), cert, denied, 913 P.2d 749
(Utah 1996) .
When a trial court concludes that the incident to which
defendant objects likely did not prejudice the jury, the trial
court should deny the motion.

The Utah Supreme Court has

explained:
Unless a review of the record shows that the
court's decision is plainly wrong in that the
incident so likely influenced the jury that
the defendant cannot be said to have had a
8

fair trial, we will not find that the court's
decision was an abuse of discretion. We
review such a decision with just deference
because of the advantaged position of the
trial judge to determine the impact of events
occurring in the courtroom on the total
proceedings. . . .
State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1230 (Utah 1997) (citing Burton
v. Zions Corp. Mercantile Inst., 249 P.2d 514, 517 (Utah 1952)),
overruled on other grounds by State v. Weeks, 2002 UT 98, 1 24,
61 P.3d 1000.
Here, in the course of the trial, defendant objected to
several of the prosecutor's questions and comments.

He objected

to questions about the number and age of children on the premises
when the officers spoke with defendant at his home (R. 199: 3738, 52). He objected to questions about the proper storage of
explosives (Id. at 105-06, 113). He objected during closing
arguments to the prosecutor's characterization of recklessness as
"disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable . . . risk that
you'll blow something up" and to a statement that "we don't want
[explosives] falling into terrorist's hands" (Id. at 220, 202). 3

3

On appeal, he adds to this list questions to which he did
not object and which are, accordingly, unpreserved — questions
asked of the sole defense witness about how blasting caps can be
dangerous to children and how children play with dynamite (Id. at
160-61, 165). For the first time on appeal, he also objects to a
statement by the prosecutor in closing argument, referencing the
presence of children at defendant's home and the ways in which
children can play with inherently dangerous explosives (Id. at
202). Because defendant made no objection to these statements
below, the trial court had no opportunity to rule on them.
Accordingly, this Court should not consider them now. See State
9

At the end of trial, defendant moved for a mistrial, arguing
that the State's remarks had a cumulative effect and "potentially
inflame[d] the passions of the jury where they would convict, not
based on facts and evidence, not based on the law, but based upon
this fear, danger and things blowing up."
(replacement page).

(Id. at 224)

In rejecting defendant's argument, the court

ruled:
You know, counsel, I felt like the statement
relating to terrorist or terrorism was
inappropriate. I immediately cautioned the
jury with regard to that. I struck that from
the record. They were advised in the
instructions that they were to disregard
that, and I have the firm belief that if
there was any impropriety with regard to
that, that was corrected and we did
everything that was appropriate and possible
under those circumstances.
Secondly, with regard to any cumulative
effect, I think that . . . the State's
entitled to make logical inferences, and I
don't think that the bounds were exceeded
with regard to those, and based on that I'm
not going to grant a mistrial under those
circumstances. . . .
(Id. at 225-26).
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in so ruling.
Following the prosecutor's reference to "terrorist's hands,"
defense counsel promptly objected, a sidebar was held, and the
court ruled:

v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995).
10

Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, and I want
you to disregard, and I'm going to strike
from the record any reference to terrorists
or terrorism with regard to this matter and
you're not to consider that as part of your
deliberations. I'm going to allow the State
to continue and proceed under those
circumstances.
(R. 199: 203). The court properly handled defendant's objection.
See State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, 1 24, 999 P.2d 7 (noting that
defendant's prompt objection, the trial court's sustaining of the
objection, and an immediate curative instruction negated a
demonstration of prejudice resulting from the prosecutor's
improper comment).

At the end of trial, the court additionally

instructed the jury that any evidence "which was rejected by me
or ordered stricken out by me may not be considered by you" and
that "[y]ou are not to consider evidence offered but not
admitted, nor any evidence stricken by the Court" (Id. at 182,
188).

Under these circumstances, where the trial court

participated throughout the trial and evaluated the negligible
impact of the isolated remark on the proceedings as a whole, it
cannot reasonably be said that the court was "plainly wrong" and,
consequently, that it abused its discretion.

See Robertson, 932

P.2d at 1230.
As to the remaining questions and comments, even assuming
arguendo that the prosecutor should not have referenced the
dangers of explosives to children, issues of proper storage of
explosives, or regulations governing safe handling of explosives,
11

defendant has wholly failed to demonstrate that, absent these
references, his trial outcome would likely have been different.
First, the evidence against defendant was very strong.

See,

e.g., Schultz, 2002 UT App 366 at 1 35 (harmless error where
substantial evidence supported conviction).

Two police officers

explicitly asked defendant if he had dynamite in his house, and
he unequivocally responded that he did (R. 199: 36, 86). 4 When
asked to show the officers where it was, defendant led them
directly to the root cellar in the back yard (Id. at 39, 87) .
Once in the cellar, he told the officers this was where the
dynamite was (Id. at 41). And, indeed, there it was (Id. at 43,
89) .
Second, defendant's theory of defense was unconvincing.
Focusing not on mens era but on "possession" as the linchpin of
his defense, defendant contended that the explosives belonged to
his friend, who was properly licensed to possess them.

He

asserted that a workman had inadvertently unloaded the explosives
from the friend's truck in the course of delivering building
materials to defendant (Id. at 27-29, 146, 150-52).
Consequently, defendant maintained, he did not exercise control

4

The detective who interviewed defendant testified that,
contrary to the officers' testimony, defendant denied responding
in the affirmative to the officer's question about possessing
dynamite in his home (R. 199: 125). If defendant's statement was
true, however, it makes no sense that defendant then promptly led
the officers to the root cellar where the officers found the
explosives.
12

and dominion over the explosives and thus did not "possess" them.
Defendant presented his defense through the trial testimony
of his friend, Kelly Alvey.

Alvey initially confirmed that he

was in the mining business, that he was licensed to handle
explosives, and that he often delivered building supplies to
defendant (Id. at 145-46, 150). He further stated that at some
unspecified time, he realized some dynamite was missing and
"became aware" that it had been unloaded at defendant's home (Id.
at 154).
Defendant's theory that Alvey possessed the explosives
disintegrated under the State's questioning during crossexamination.

When the State showed a picture of the detonator

cord found in the root cellar to Alvey, he stated it was likely
not his.

He explained, "I don't think I had det cord.

Usually,

when I went to the Uintahs I never used det cord, so, I don't
think that's mine" (Id. at 156; accord id. at 168). When the
State showed him a photograph of the box of blasting caps, Alvey
stated he hadn't seen the box before (Id. at 154). When the
State showed him a photograph of the blasting caps lined up
touching each other inside the box, he said, "[M]y caps, when I
get them, they're usually in a foam thing and they're stuck in
like that" (Id. at 160). Referencing the blasting caps touching
each other rather than being individually cushioned and separated
by foam, he explained, " [T]hat's an old way.

13

I mean, that's how,

well, like it [i.e. the box] says,

A

91" (Id.).

Finally, as to

the dynamite, Alvey testified that if the dynamite was sweating,
as the lead police officer concluded it was and the bomb
technician confirmed it was beginning to do, then it "couldn't
have been" his (Id. at 46, 63, 66-67, 100, 112, 163). He agreed
that, given the description of the dynamite, it was probably fair
to say it was not his (Id. at 165-66).
Under these factual circumstances, the jury was not
convinced by defendant's argument that the explosives belonged to
Alvey and that defendant, accordingly, did not "possess" them.
Where defendant's own witness disclaimed possession and defendant
told the officers he had explosives and then led the officers
directly to them, the State adduced proof beyond a reasonable
doubt that defendant knowingly possessed the explosives.5

5

Defendant contends that "the prejudice analysis here
turns on the reasonable-doubt standard," arguing that because the
jury was presented with conflicting evidence, it must necessarily
have entertained a reasonable doubt about his guilt. See Br. of
Aplt. at 19-21. Specifically, he argues that Alvey's testimony
"raised reasonable doubt with respect to [defendant's] mental
state in purportedly possessing the explosives" (Id. at 20).
The presentation of conflicting evidence, however, does not ipso
facto create reasonable doubt. Resolving evidentiary conflicts
is a job entrusted to the jury, whose domain it is to sort
through the evidence, weigh it, and assess witness
credibility. See, e.g. , State v. Haves, 860 P.2d 968, 972 (Utah
App. 1993)(citing State v. Jonas, 793 P.2d 901, 904-05 (Utah App.
1990) ) (noting jury is exclusive judge of witness credibility and
weight to be accorded particular evidence). Thus, Alvey's
testimony would have created reasonable doubt only if the jury
had found it credible.
14

The comments and questions to which defendant objects do
nothing '

undermine th 1 s outcome

T : suggest that the jury

convicted defendant only because the prosecutor asked questions
and made comments about the dangers of explosives to children or
to issues around safe storage and handling of explosives flies in
the face of defendant's clear admission to the officers, both by
words ai 1 d by a z t:i • : i 1,

1 1 i a !:: I: 1 e had explosives in his home.

However

objectionable the comments or questions may have been, they do
noth:i i 1 g t: : ::1 i m i i i :i s 1 I 11 I e o",i;; rer\ ihelming

direct evidence of •

defendant's guilt or to suggest that the verdict would likely
have been different in their absence.
Finally, any errors the prosecutor may have committed were
ameliorated by the jury instructions, to which defendant has
mounted no challenge.

The court instructed the jury that before

it could find defendant guilty of possession of an explosive
d e v i : e , i t i n i s t f :i i i :I ] : : t i: I v" :: o i I d u c t prohibited ] : • y ] a v. " ,_.:__: z h e
applicable, culpable mental state or states with regard to the
conduct prohibited !»y 1 r-r /" ("

).

Th^ juiv itrh'iii'1 i ~-iic;

correctly recited the charge, with the three applicable mental
states plainly listed in the alternative

(Id. at 180, 1 9 7 ) .

The

instructions also clearly defined each of the three mental
states, leaving no doubt that the jury had only to find one of
them in oiclei 1 * » convict

(Id. at " - 9 3 ) .

Other instructions

told the jury they must be governed solely by the law, that the

law forbids them from being governed "by mere conjecture,
passion, [or] prejudice;" and that any evidence "rejected by me
or ordered stricken out by me may not be considered by you" (Id.
at 182, 183).

They were further instructed not to "consider nor

be influenced by any statement of counsel as to what the evidence
is unless it is stated correctly, nor by any statement of counsel
of facts not shown in the evidence if any such has been made"
(Id. at 185) .
Guided by these instructions, the jury need only have
believed that defendant was "aware of the nature of his conduct
or the existing circumstances" in order to find that he knowingly
possessed the explosives (Id. at 192). The testimony of the
officers that defendant admitted he had explosives in his home
and, upon request, immediately led the officers to the root
cellar to show the explosives to them amply establishes the
"knowing" mens rea.
The law is well-settled that defendant is entitled to a fair
trial, not a perfect one.

State v. Baker, 935 P.2d 503, 506

(Utah 1997)(quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681
(1986)).

Where defendant failed to demonstrate that the

allegedly improper comments and questions were so prejudicial as
to render a different verdict likely in their absence, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion for

16

mistrial on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct.
Pritchett,

.

See, e.g.,

".
CONCLUSION

F' or tl 1 3 reasons stated, •

"

:

affirm defendant's

conviction on one count of possession of an incendiary device, a
second degree felony.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 9th day of July, 2007.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General
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JOANNE C. SLOTNIK
Assistant Attorney General
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